In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE: February 8, 1971

TO: AMEMBASSY TEHRAN — For the Attention of

FROM: Department of State (S/R:ORM)

TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE	TO THE DEPARTMENT
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REFERENCE

State 13648, Tehran 609

ITEMS/REMARKS

Attached are the materials requested in your 609.

Attachments:

1. CA- 3252, dated October 14, 1959.
2. CA- 6120, dated January 29, 1960.
3. CA- 6643, dated March 19, 1968.
4. CA- 253, dated July 8, 1964.

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NUMBER AND DRAFTING OFFICE

FILE NO.	SIGNATURE
	Donald R. Parsons
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GPO 1965 O—202-212—(671)

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NO.: CA-3252, October 14, 1959,

SUBJECT: DCID No. 4/2

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With reference to CA-1694 of August 19, 1958, a revision of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 4/2, "The Defector Program Abroad," is enclosed.

The revised Directive, effective 26 June 1959, reflects the change in the name of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to the United States Intelligence Board.

HERTER

Enclosure:

DCID No. 4/2
(See attached distribution list.)

WHEN THE ENCLOSURE IS DETACHED, THIS DOCUMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTION LIST MAY BE DOWNGRADED TO:
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CA-3252
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SECRET DCID No. 4/2 (New Series)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4/2*

THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM ABROAD

(Effective 26 June 1959)

1. *SCOPE*

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 4, this directive establishes procedures for the inducement, exploitation, resettlement and further handling of defectors outside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions. This directive does not apply in active theaters of war where U.S. Forces are engaged or where the President so directs.

2. *DEFINITIONS*

For the purpose of this directive, the terms listed below shall have the meanings indicated:

a. *Defectors:* Defectors are defined as nationals of the USSR or a country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc who have escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto and who are of special value to the U.S. Government because:

(1) They are able to add valuable new or confirmatory information to existing U.S. knowledge of the Soviet world;

(2) They are of operational value to a U.S. department or agency; or

(3) Their defection can be psychologically exploited to the advantage of the United States.

b. *Inducement:* Inducement is an act committed or manifestly instigated by a U.S. official and demonstrably intended to bring about a defection for which the U.S. Government might, if the act were discovered, be called upon to account.

c. *Potential Defector:* A potential defector is a national of the USSR or a country of the Sino-Soviet Bloc who (1) is dissatisfied or potentially estranged in the allegiance to the government of his nationality, (2) may reasonably be expected to be susceptible to defection or recruitment in place, and (3) appears to meet the special values criteria of a defector as set forth in para. 2.a. above.

d. *Disaffected Person:* A disaffected person is a potential defector who, either through inducement or voluntary action on his part, has indicated willingness or desire to defect.

e. *Walk-In:* A walk-in is a disaffected person who presents himself to a U.S. installation in a foreign country and requests asylum or assistance in escaping from Communist control.

f. *Refugee:* A refugee is a national or former national of a Communist-dominated country, who has fled from and/or is unwilling to return

*This Directive supersedes DCID No. 4/2 (New Series), dated 29 April 1958, which previously had superseded IDCOP No. 2 (June 1954).

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[illegible] does not possess another citizenship, has not been integrated into the economy of the country of present residence, and who is not a defector.

b. *Escapee:* An escapee is a refugee who is a national (1) of a European satellite (except ethnic Germans) or Yugoslavia who has escaped since 1 January 1946, or (2) of the USSR irrespective of the date of his escape, or (3) of Communist China or the Asian satellites on a very selective basis.

3. *NON-SOVIET BLOC NATIONALS*

The provisions of this directive may be applied in whole or in part to cases of nationals of countries other than the USSR or the Sino-Soviet Bloc, who otherwise meet the definition of defectors in para. 2.a. above, when such action is approved by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the United States Intelligence Board. Such action is normally recommended by the Interagency Defector Committee (IDC), Washington.

4. *SUMMARY OF U.S. POLICY CONCERNING THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM*

a. Defection, particularly from the USSR, should be encouraged and induced, employing both conventional and unconventional means, whenever there is a net advantage to U.S. interests. Accordingly, the United States should:

(1) Encourage and induce the defection of the maximum number of persons from the USSR and of Soviet nationals outside the USSR.

(2) Continue, and if possible expand, efforts to encourage and induce the defection of key members of elite groups of countries other than the USSR who may qualify as defectors.

b. To encourage defection and discourage redefection, the United States should assure defectors adequate care, maintenance, and resettlement assistance not only during, but also after their exploitation or utilization.

c. The United States should take no action to encourage the departure of large numbers of nationals from countries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc other than the USSR.

d. Prior to initiation by any U.S. department or agency of action to induce defection of a potential defector or disaffected person, the possible value of recruitment in place will be considered carefully. Where the best interest of the United States would be served by such recruitment of the individual concerned, the provisions of DCID No. 5/1 shall apply.

e. It shall be the general policy that no bona fide defector will be returned without his consent.

f. Intelligence considerations and objectives shall take priority and shall be satisfied prior to psychological exploitation of defectors. Psychological exploitation will be restricted to specific cases where a net advantage to the United States can be expected. These policies shall be implemented to the extent practical in cases where a defector is under the control of another government outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

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g. Implementation of overt publicity concerning defectors shall be coordinated with the Department of State.

h. Coordination, as provided herein, shall respect the interests, capabilities and responsibilities of all departments and agencies to insure full use of such capabilities in support of the defector program.

5. *LOCAL DEFECTOR COMMITTEES*

A local Defector Committee shall be established under the general supervision of the Senior U.S. Representative in appropriate countries. The Committee shall consist of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Chairman, Department of State, and Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Committee may invite representatives of other departments and agencies to attend its meetings on an ad hoc basis. The local Defector Committee shall:

a. Meet periodically, normally at least once quarterly, to coordinate interagency aspects of the defector program in the area concerned and to promote the full use of the resources and capabilities of the U.S. Government in support of this program. Copies of minutes of all local Defector Committee meetings shall be forwarded through CIA channels to IDC/Washington.

b. Consider and resolve mutual problems including initial consideration of disaffected persons believed to meet the criteria established in para. 2.a. above who are nominated by a member. When such problems cannot be resolved by the local committee, the matter shall be referred through CIA channels to IDC/Washington. In such cases representatives of other departments or agencies may communicate directly with their principals in Washington on the subjects involved. If time does not permit referral to IDC/Washington, the matter shall be submitted for decision to the Senior U.S. Representative in the area.

c. Keep IDC/Washington informed concerning each defector, including status of exploitation and termination of the case. Appropriate reports on disaffected persons will be made to IDC/Washington, except when recruitment in place or other operational use is contemplated.

d. Recommend supplemental procedures in consonance with this directive for approval by IDC/Washington as may be required for implementation of the defector program in the area concerned. Such procedures shall (1) provide for appropriate security measures for the personnel and facilities involved in the program, and (2) insure that: (a) at the earliest possible time, information related to imminence of hostilities or immediate threat to the security of a U.S. installation is sought from the disaffected person or walk-in, (b) such information is given immediate dissemination in the field and at the national level with appropriate source attribution and evaluation, and (c) the disaffected person or walk-in is transferred to CIA control at the earliest possible time, together with the clothing, documents and other possessions and the full results of any preliminary debriefing of the individual.

e. Establish local operating procedures to insure that walk-in cases are promptly referred to the proper official of the U.S. installation involved and handled under conditions insuring the maximum possible security for both the individual concerned and local U.S. installations.

TSC 030574

f. Establish procedures to insure that all members of the local Defector Committee are kept currently informed on local defector problems as well as applicable U.S. policies and procedures.

g. Recommend to IDC/Washington proposals for surfacing or the release of information publicly concerning a defector.

6. *OPERATING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES*

a. The treatment received by a potential defector or disaffected person upon first contact with a U.S. official may influence his decision to defect or his future usefulness to the United States. Any query directly or through an intermediary by a potential defector to ascertain the opportunity of admission to the United States or for other assistance for himself and family should be met with a clear indication of the difficulties involved without indicating that the difficulties are insurmountable. Except in cases of recruitment in place, or other operational use, no firm financial or other commitments shall be made until the case has been considered by the local Defector Committee and, in the event movement to the United States is involved, appropriate clearances are obtained from Washington. As early as feasible, each disaffected person should be required to sign a statement indicating that his defection was purely voluntary and that he desires political asylum.

b. The case of any disaffected person or defector in the hands of a non-Sino-Soviet Bloc government that becomes known to any U.S. Government official abroad should be reported promptly to the Chairman of the local Defector Committee who will consult with appropriate members of the Committee and be responsible for taking and coordinating action in the interest of the United States. To the extent feasible, defectors under the control of another government will be exploited in the interest of the U.S. Government as provided herein. It is recognized, however, that political considerations of and agreements with a host government may affect exploitation of defectors under its control.

c. When a defector is to be used for operational purposes and when his identity should be concealed, the Chairman of the local Defector Committee will inform the Committee of the existence — but not the identity — of the defector together with a general statement of his background, area knowledge and field of relative competence. DCID No. 5/1 shall apply to such cases. Efforts shall be made to satisfy intelligence requirements as promptly and completely as possible.

d. Information related to imminence of hostilities or immediate threat to the security of a U.S. installation will be sought at the earliest possible time from disaffected persons.

e. The establishment of bona fides of disaffected persons will be given particular attention because of the demonstrated use of defector channels by hostile services to penetrate and convey false or deceptive information to U.S. intelligence services.

7. *RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIELD REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA*

The Field Representative of CIA has primary responsibility for the conduct of the defector program abroad and for providing certain services of common concern. He shall:

a. Conduct, as the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence, all defector activities conducted within his area of responsibility including:

(1) Liaison with the intelligence and security services or other interested elements of foreign governments on defector matters,

(2) Promotion of the full use of the resources and capabilities of all departments and agencies in support of this program,

(3) Inducement operations and operational use of defectors by other departments and agencies in accordance with the provisions of DCID No. 5/1.

b. In consultation with the local Defector Committee:

(1) Determine, in the case of disaffected persons, the special values applicable and the risk, if any, to the political, military, diplomatic and security interests of the United States.

(2) Insure appropriate and prompt dissemination of intelligence information obtained from defectors, and

(3) Determine such special handling techniques, including restriction of local dissemination of information, as may be required in cases of disaffected persons or defectors when exceptional political, military, diplomatic, security or other factors are involved. In appropriate cases, recommendations for special handling will be sent to IDC/Washington.

c. Induce defection and use defectors operationally.

d. Establish the bona fides of disaffected persons in consultation with the representatives of appropriate departments or agencies who may have participated in the identification or delivery of the disaffected person, or for other reasons may have a special interest or capability in the area.

(1) Representatives of departments and agencies concerned will be kept informed on a timely basis during the process of determining bona fides and will be provided a final summary when bona fides and special values are established. At such time, departments and agencies concerned will be provided access, initially to satisfy security or other operational intelligence requirements and thereafter for other exploitation purposes.

(2) Information indicating imminence of hostilities or other highly significant intelligence information of immediate interest will be sought at the earliest opportunity and given immediate dissemination in the field and at the national level. Debriefing of defectors to obtain intelligence information of immediate operational value will be conducted in conjunction with other departments and agencies concerned; specific operational leads, applicable to their clandestine activities, will be made available to appropriate departments and agencies.

(3) When the bona fides of a disaffected person cannot be established within a reasonable time, the other members of the local Defector Committee will be given a situation report on the disaffected person together with a general statement of his alleged background,

area knowledge and skill of relative competence. Specific intelligence requirements will be processed and satisfied as promptly and fully as possible, normally with direct access to the disaffected person by the departments and agencies concerned under conditions established by the CIA representative in the light of the unusual circumstances of the case.

(4) When counter-espionage operational action is indicated because hostile agent status is established or must be assumed, the provisions of this directive shall not apply and the case shall be handled in accordance with DCID No. 5/1. When counter-espionage action is not indicated, and prior to disposal of such cases, departments and agencies will be provided an opportunity to request the servicing of specific requirements under conditions established by the CIA representative, normally by direct access to the disaffected person.

e. Inform the Senior U.S. Representative in the area involved of the presence of a defector or potential defector and advise such representative on all aspects of defector matters.

f. Debrief defectors for positive intelligence information with participation by departments and agencies involved in the defector program.

g. Provide or arrange for secure facilities and personnel for the processing and debriefing of defectors including transportation or evacuation to secure areas as required.

h. Provide or arrange for care, maintenance, rehabilitation and resettlement of defectors within the limits of available funds.

i. Serve as the channel of communication between the local Defector Committee and IDC/Washington.

j. Conduct liaison with foreign intelligence and security services concerning defector matters including the exchange of interrogation reports.

8. *RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIELD REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE*

Designated representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force:

a. Subject to the provisions of para. 7.a. above, may conduct supplemental activities in support of the defector program including the inducement of defection, liaison with foreign intelligence and security services concerning defector matters, and exchange of their own interrogation reports.

b. Shall report promptly to CIA representatives the identity of any potential defector together with all available pertinent information.

c. Shall provide, within their capabilities, transportation, housing, personnel and other facilities in support of the defector program.

d. Shall advise the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence of the political, military, diplomatic, or security implications of actions proposed or taken in support of this program.

9. *RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SENIOR U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN THE AREA*

The Senior U.S. Representative in the area concerned will be responsible for:

b. Determining, with the advice and recommendation of the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence, the manner and degree to which actions contemplated toward a disaffected person or defector may affect the political and diplomatic interests of the U.S.

c. Insuring that appropriate U.S. officials, not covered by para. 5.f, who are likely to be in contact with disaffected persons are given limited briefing concerning defector matters as provided herein.

d. Coordinating with the representatives of interested U.S. departments and agencies and, to the degree necessary, with appropriate foreign governmental agencies, any publicity or psychological exploitation of a defector.

e. Providing assistance to the CIA representative in carrying out his responsibilities under this directive.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

TSC 030571

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NO.: CA-6120, January 29, 1960 COPY NO. 1

Copy sent Dublin 4/5/60 per Tel 490 4/4/60

SUBJECT: Protection of Defectors in Foreign Countries

TO: All American Diplomatic Missions (except Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia and Warsaw), and ALEXANDRIA, ALGIERS, BERLIN, BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, CASABLANCA, DACCA, DAKAR, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, HONG KONG, ISFAHAN, ISTANBUL, LAGOS, LAHORE, LEOPOLDVILLE, MADRAS, MESHED, NAIROBI, SALZBURG, SINGAPORE, TABRIZ, TANGIER, TRIESTE, USUN

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Background

Increased travel and the establishment of diplomatic missions between Sino-Soviet bloc countries and the free world is likely to involve a larger number of Foreign Service posts in the handling of defectors, as prescribed by current intelligence directives. These directives provide general guidance on many of the detailed steps involved in defector procedures. Nevertheless, recent experience suggests the timeliness of reviewing some of the principles affecting the status and welfare of individual defectors, the traditional American attitude in this field, and particularly the commanding position of the host countries in which defection occurs.

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Concept of Political Asylum

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A defector who is not facing a charge of illegal action on the part of the host country may properly apply to American representatives for territorial asylum in the United States. Two paragraphs of DCID 4/2 (transmitted to most posts with CA-3252 of October 14, 1959) refer to "asylum" as follows:

Paragraph 2(e): "Walk-In: A walk-in is a disaffected person who presents himself to a United States installation in a foreign country and requests asylum or assistance in escaping from Communist control."

Paragraph 6(a) "... as early as feasible, each disaffected person shall be required to sign a statement indicating that his defection was purely voluntary and that he desires political

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CLEARANCES: SOV - Mr. Boster EE - Mr. Vedeler GER - Mr. McKiernan - Mr. Cameron
CIA Army - Mrs. Matlack FE - Mr. William H. Sullivan
NEA - Mr. ARA - Mr. Hill AF - Mr. Ruchti

CENTRAL FILE

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political asylum."

The Department considers that the word "asylum" in the context of the paragraph quoted above should be interpreted as meaning territorial asylum in the United States rather than diplomatic asylum in an American official establishment.

In extending protection to a defector, the sovereign rights of the host government (as well as its political orientation) must necessarily be kept in mind. Finally, American officials must take all feasible steps to prevent the involuntary return of defectors to their countries of origin. It may be advisable to call the attention of local officials to Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (General Assembly Resolution of December 10, 1948) as one of the reasons which they might use in resisting demands for the return of the defector to his country of origin. Article 14 of the Declaration states that "everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution".

Possible Procedures for Protecting Defectors

Attachment 2 outlines a recent case in which the rights of the defector, of the United States, and of the host country, were successfully protected and reconciled. It is therefore recommended that when similar cases arise, posts make every effort to carry out the following procedures:

1. Qualified Foreign Service representatives shall accompany the defector in carrying out any essential legal activities (registration, documentation, interrogation, etc.) which may be required to comply with the laws or regulations of the host country.

2. If confrontation with his former principals cannot be avoided, a Foreign Service officer should be present during such confrontation, which should be held in a language understandable to the two principals as well as to the U.S. representative. Local officials should be persuaded that any deviation from normal confrontation procedures (see Attachment 3) should constitute grounds for immediate termination of the proceedings.

Possible Procedure in Case of Redefection

If the defector executed a statement requesting U.S. asylum at the time of his defection, every effort should be made during

(and after)

(and after) a confrontation that leads to his redefection to have the defector execute a final statement in which he declares that: a) the return to his country of origin is of his own free will, without duress or coercion; (b) he was not deprived of his legal rights at any time while in U.S. custody; and (c) he regards his original request for U.S. asylum as being no longer valid.

Problems Peculiar to West Germany Including Berlin

In Germany, U.S. military commands are in direct contact with Soviet military missions and headquarters and are responsible for arranging confrontations of military defectors. This instruction is not intended to alter existing arrangements in this regard. Posts in Germany, however, may wish to suggest such alterations, either through the channels of the Defector Committee (Germany) or directly to the Department, for consideration by the Interagency Defector Committee in Washington.

This instruction should be shown to all members of the local defector committee at each addressee post.

HERTER

Enclosures:

1. The Kaznacheev Case
2. Guidance for the Conduct of Confrontations

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The Kaznacheev Case

June 23, 1959: The Soviet Information Officer, Kaznacheev, visited the USIS Library in Rangoon and asked the Librarian if he could see an American Embassy official. The request was transmitted to CAS and a CAS representative came over from the Embassy a few blocks away to interview him. Kaznacheev gave the officer a general account of himself and his motives and requested safe exit from Burma. A further meeting was arranged for 9.00 a.m. the next day (June 24) and Kaznacheev returned to his home for the night.

The case was discussed on the afternoon of June 23 with the local Defector Committee in Rangoon, the Ambassador and the USIS representative. The consensus was that Kaznacheev would be accepted as a defector subject to the establishment of bona fides.

June Kaznacheev appeared as scheduled at 9.00 a.m. and signed a simple asylum request. He was taken to the residence of the Army Attache for preliminary interrogation and at 1.00 p.m. was transferred to the American Embassy.

June 24 and 25: Efforts were made to obtain Burmese permission to surface the defector locally and remove him overtly from Burma. There were several meetings between US Embassy personnel and officials of the Government of Burma during this time.

June 25: With the Department's approval, CIA instructed CAS Rangoon that while surfacing in Burma would be preferable, if such were not possible, unilateral control of the case should be maintained, including black removal to Bangkok.

June 26: In the morning the Embassy received permission from the Government of Burma to surface Kaznacheev the next day with the understanding that he was to be removed from Burma as soon as possible thereafter. The Air Attache made the necessary arrangements for air transportation out of Burma and a USAF C-130 aircraft arrived in Rangoon on the afternoon of the 27th.

At noon on June 26, the Ambassador called on the Burmese Foreign Minister to inform him of the circumstances and arrangements made through Burmese security and intelligence officials for the safeguarding, surfacing, timing of publicity and removal of Kaznacheev by plane. The Foreign Minister had already been briefed on the case by Burmese sources.

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In the afternoon of the 26th the Foreign Office notified the Ambassador that the Soviet Embassy had inquired about Kaznacheev and had been informed that the latter was in the custody of the US Embassy. Later the same evening the Burmese Foreign Office notified the Ambassador that the Burmese Government permission to remove Kaznacheev from the country had been withdrawn.

The story was released by the US Embassy to the local press and wire services at 8.00 pm. local time June 26th as the Embassy was anxious to beat the Soviets on any news release.

June 27: A press conference was held at the US Embassy. Kaznacheev was interviewed and pictures taken.

Several meetings were held between US Embassy personnel and officials of the Burmese Foreign Office and Military Intelligence which culminated in a meeting between the Ambassador and the Burmese Prime Minister, who discussed the legal aspects of the case. They agreed that, prior to being removed from Burma, Kaznacheev would be turned over to the Burmese Foreign Minister and thus technically be in Burmese custody for a short while. He would then be asked whether he was acting of his own free will and offered Burmese asylum. If he stated that he prefered asylum in the US, he would be returned to the custody of the Embassy. Prior to turning him back to the US, the Burmese would give the Soviet Ambassador an opportunity to speak to Kaznacheev in the presence of Burmese officials. The US Ambassador accepted these conditions, but further stipulated that the American representatives must be present when the Soviet Ambassador spoke with Kaznacheev and that the conversation must be entirely in English.

June 29: Embassy officers introduced Kaznacheev to the US Ambassador at 10.15 a.m. The Ambassador took him to the Burmese National Defense College at noon where he met the Foreign Minister. The Ambassador left him there, returned to the Embassy (as a token gesture) and went back to the Defense College at 12.30 p.m. The Burmese talked to Kaznacheev for about four hours. The Soviet Ambassador had been offered the opportunity to talk to Kaznacheev, but rejected it on grounds of insufficient time to obtain instructions from Moscow.

The US Ambassador personally took Kaznacheev to the airport where he left in the USAF plane at 4.47 p.m. Burmese time (Details of the trip to the airport are given in Rangoon despatch No. 6 of July 2, 1959).

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Some weeks later, the US Ambassador summarized the case as follows:

"The Burmese correctly perceived that they needed access to Kaznacheev to ascertain the actual facts of the case and to protect themselves against criticism by the Soviet Embassy. They had received allegations from the Soviet Embassy that Kaznacheev had been enticed, entrapped, or otherwise improperly induced to go to the American Embassy. They needed to satisfy themselves that no Burmese law had been broken by Kaznacheev or by the Americans, that Kaznacheev had acted of his own volition, and that their responsibilities to the Soviet Embassy and its personnel had been properly discharged.

"My conclusion is that the Burmese Foreign Office originally was somewhat confused as to what constitutes diplomatic asylum and as to our intentions to give the Government of Burma access to Kaznacheev. At first they erroneously felt that they could properly treat him more or less as a prisoner, even compelling him to face the Soviet Ambassador against his wishes, and without an American being present. They eventually abandoned this position under pressure from me, and fully recognized his full rights as a free man under Burmese law.

"This Embassy handled the case in accordance with standing instructions for the treatment of defector cases. It neither claimed nor exercised any privilege of extending diplomatic asylum and never maintained that Kaznacheev was exempt from Burmese jurisdiction. The Embassy in no wise departed from the American tradition against the use of its diplomatic missions for purposes of diplomatic asylum."

SECRET
(Security Classification)

SECRET
(Security Classification)

GUIDANCE FOR THE CONDUCT OF CONFRONTATIONS WITH DEFECTORS

The confrontation usually begins by having an official of the local Foreign Ministry introduce the participants to each other. The Soviet Bloc representatives are entitled to ask the following types of questions:

1. Is it true that the defector has requested political asylum from the U.S. or the local government?

2. Is this a voluntary act on his part?

3. Does he realize the seriousness of his decision? Is he prepared to give up his family, his friends, his rights and privileges, and to cut himself off from the life he has known?

4. Has he made any attempt to inform his relatives of his decision?

5. Will he accept communications from his relatives and friends? (If he agrees, the text of such communications may be read to him.) Inspite of pleas by his associates to reconsider his decision, is he still sure he wishes to defect?

6. Is his health good?

7. Is he employed?

8. Has he applied for another citizenship? Has he surrendered his identity documents to local or U.S. authorities? (If so, these documents can later be claimed through normal channels by the issuing government.)

The confrontation should be terminated at once if the Bloc representatives begin to use a language which is not understood by the U.S. representatives or if any threats are made against the defector's relatives or friends (or, of course, against himself). Tape recording of the confrontation should not be allowed in view of the ease with which the record might be falsified for propaganda and other purposes.

SECRET
(Security Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

POL 30-1
REF
AR POL 30
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CA-253 — NO.

UNCLASSIFIED — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO All American Diplomatic and Consular Posts

FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE: Jul 8 3 15 PM '64

SUBJECT Revision of 2 FAM 225.2: Restrictions on Extending Asylum.

REF

1964 JUL 8 PM 5 54

Attached is a revised text of 2 FAM 225.2 relating to "Restrictions on Extending Asylum."

As can be seen from the retention of the first sentence of the previous 2 FAM 225.2, it remains the policy of the United States not to grant refuge in any except extraordinary cases.

At the same time experience has indicated that there are cases, other than those where an individual is in imminent danger of physical harm from mob violence, in which refuge should be granted. Illustrative of such cases are instances where imminent danger comes from wanton or reckless acts of government authorities. In order to clarify the situation th insertion of "as" before "from mob violence" in the regulatio explicitly renders the phrase illustrative rather than apparently limiting.

The grant of this authority does not of course mean that refuge should be granted to a person subject to regular and orderly legal procedures of the host government. You will recognize that any grant of refuge can be construed as an interference with the sovereignty of the host government. It is apparent, therefore, that you must exercise extreme cautio before invoking your discretion to grant refuge.

Immediately upon granting refuge, the Embassy or Consula should urgently contact the Department for instructions, giving all relevant information. Consulates in addition shou

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FORM DS-323

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Drafted by: RLSeidenwurm CBS
Contents and Classification Approved by: Mr. Crockett
EUR-Mr.Mallin NEA-Mr.Lee
L-Mr.Meeker FE-Mr. Kattenburg AF-FLHadsel FLH ARA-Mr.Abraham

UNCLASSIFIED

every effort to obtain the guidance of the Ambassador. Until ructions are received from the Department, Embassies and ulates should answer any queries from the refugee or the host nment concerning the refugee's presence by stating that they awaiting instructions from Washington.

Refuge will normally continue until such time as the opriate autho ies of the established national government give factory ces that the refugee's personal safety will be nteed agains awless or arbitrary actions and that he will be ded due process of law. Any questions as to the satisfactory acter of the assurances should be referred to the Department.

BALL, ACTING

chment:

Revision of 2 FAM 225.2

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"Restrictions on Extending Asylum.

As a rule, a diplomatic or consular officer shall not extend asylum to persons outside of his official or personal household. Refuge may be afforded to uninvited persons who are in danger of serious harm, as from mob violence, but only for the period during which active danger continues. Refuge shall be terminated on receipt of satisfactory assurances from the established national government that the refugee's personal safety is guaranteed against lawless or arbitrary actions and that he will be accorded due process of law." (2 FAM 225.2)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 30

Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

SECRET

HANDLING INDICATOR

CA-6643

NO.

TO : ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

COPY NO. 1, SERIES A

MAR 19 3 21 PM '68

FROM : Department of State

DATE:

SUBJECT : Confrontation in Defector Cases Involving Nationals of the USSR and the Communist Countries of Eastern Europe

REF : CA-6120, January 29, 1960

SECRET

LIMDIS

1. The Department has recently conducted a thorough review of our confrontation policy regarding defectors from the Soviet Union and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Our purpose was to bring policy in line with the aims of serving legitimate intelligence objectives as well as protecting US citizens against involuntary detention in the countries concerned and avoiding unnecessary complications in our relations with those countries.

2. The Department has reached a policy decision that in general the Governments of the USSR and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe will be notified of defections of their nationals to the United States and that arrangements will be made for confrontation of such defectors with appropriate representatives of their own government if requested.

3. Accordingly, all defectors from the areas concerned should be told immediately after they come under our control, in the US or abroad, that their own government will in due course be informed of their defection and that they must agree to participate in a confrontation under appropriate safeguards if this should become necessary at some point during their processing. If a defector rejects the principle of confrontation in advance, the Department wishes to be consulted before his continued processing under the US Defector Program.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NARA, Date 12-19-96

SECRET

FORM DS-323 10-64

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Drafting Office	Drafting Date	Phone No.	Contents and Classification Approved by:
INR/DDC/CS:LAMeyerJr:snt	3-13-68	3121	INR/DDC/WCTrueheart

EUR/SOV:AToon EUR/EE:REL isle EUR:WJStoesselJr L - MJBelman
INR:TLHughes

ROUTING

Action	Info.	Initials
AF	NEA	CU
P	IO	
AID		
COM	FRB	INT
TR	AMB	
NAVY	OSD	
CIA		

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4. If the intelligence community considers that the circumstances of a particular defection case are such that notification and/or confrontation may jeopardize intelligence objectives, the facts should be brought to the attention of the Department for consideration in reaching a decision.

5. The Department recognizes that defection cases occurring abroad sometimes present sensitive problems of relations with third countries and that decisions regarding notice and confrontation in these situations must continue to be based on the facts of the particular case. In certain instances, it may be necessary to defer any decision concerning notice and/or confrontation until such time as the defector may enter the United States. However, when feasible, it would be desirable for posts to arrange confrontation or to encourage friendly host governments to do so before onward movement of the defector under US auspices.

6. Under this general policy, the US Government will retain that measure of flexibility that may be considered desirable in some cases for humanitarian or political reasons and that may be required in other cases to serve intelligence interests. However, it is intended that the option on the question of notice and confrontation rest with the US Government, not the defector.

7. It should be noted that this general policy is applicable only to defector cases processed under special procedures, not refugee type cases with which the intelligence community has no direct responsibility or concern.

8. This airgram, coordinated with IDC Washington, should be brought to the attention of all personnel concerned with the handling of defectors, including members of all local defector committees.

RUSK

18 Feb 1969

SECRET/NOFORN

OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE

TEHRAN INTERAGENCY DEFECTOR COMMITTEE

1. **Authority.** Authority for the establishment of local operating procedures is DCIS 4/2 (THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM ABROAD). This document establishes broadly procedures for the inducement, resettlement, and further handling of defectors and directs that each local Interagency Defector Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) prepare in detail supplemental procedures for dealing with such situations. The Tehran Committee shall consist of senior CAS official (chairman), Embassy Security Officer, Political Counselor, Defense Attache and a designated CAS officer as Secretary.

2. **Scope.** These supplemental procedures apply only to defectors or potential defectors from Soviet Orbit missions in Iran. They do not deal with the handling of CAS agents or persons being developed by CAS as agents; if a Soviet or Satellite official should become a CAS agent and remain in his job, he will be dealt with as an agent and not as a defector. As an agent, he would not normally be the subject of a CAS report to the Committee.

3. **Notification.** Members of the Committee will, at their earliest convenience and again at six-month intervals, inform appropriate personnel of the various U.S. Government agencies operating in Iran of their individual responsibility to report to the appropriate Committee member immediately (a) any indication that a Soviet or Satellite (herein-after "orbit") national has defected or (b) any indication that an orbit national is disaffected and might be considered for an induced defection effort or (c) any contacts they may have with orbit citizens except the most casual meetings on occasions of official entertainment. Specific responsibility for advising appropriate personnel of other agencies in accordance with this paragraph is established as follows:

A. The Defense Attache is responsible for insuring that appropriate personnel of ARMISH/MAAG, Genmish are properly informed

B. The Department of State representative to the Committee has identical responsibility for USIA.

SECRET/NOFORN

C. CAS will arrange with the Embassy Security Officer to have the Marine Guards and appropriate indigenous personnel briefed on the above responsibilities to the extent that they may be involved in the handling of a Walk-In.

4. Inducement. If a member of the Committee is apprised of a defection, potential defection or operationally interesting social or business contact, he will at once report the situation and circumstances to the Chairman of the Committee. Such a lead shall normally be regarded as operationally sensitive, and will remain a matter of bilateral concern between the reporting Agency and CAS, in accordance with DCIS 5/1, until determination has been made that long term recruitment and/or short term defection in place is impossible.

5. When such a situation (as described above in paragraph 4) arises, the Chairman - subject to the conditions stated above - may call a meeting of the Committee to determine (a) what asset the U.S. Government has with which or through which it could attempt to [illegible] a defection; (b) which member of the Committee can most appropriately and efficiently handle the case; (c) what approach should be taken; and (d) what offer might be made to the individual under consideration and the intermediaries, if any.

A. The member who it is determined can best handle the case will then do so in close liaison with and under the operational guidance of the CAS member. Both members will report at agreed intervals to the Committee.

B. The CAS representative will report to Washington in accordance with DCIS 4/2.

6. Reception. The reception of any defector will necessarily vary with the circumstances surrounding his defection. In order to cope most effectively with such situations, a separate document, PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING WALK-INS, has been prepared and is attached herewith as recommended operating procedure. This document contains in detail the procedure for handling a Walk-In or defector from the point he or she enters the American Embassy until CAS has assumed responsibility for the defector's disposal.

7. Responsibility Toward the Host Government. No pre-meditated set of rules can be formed to deal with this problem. Each individual case must be reviewed according to the existing circumstances and a decision made as to the proper procedures to be followed insofar as the Host Government is concerned. Consequently, the Committee must be prepared to view each case independently and to decide whether the defector shall be brought to the attention of the Host Government.

8. Interagency Defector Committee meetings will be held quarterly to discuss routine matters and procedures. They can, however, be called at any time at the initiative of any member to discuss an urgent matter.

Normally, the American Officer will attempt to put Subject at his ease; and at the same time notify the Security Officer or the Embassy Duty Officer that a package has come in which requires discussion. This will signal the Security Officer or the Duty Officer to notify CAS including the location of the Subject.

F. Requested Rendezvous. An American Officer recipient of a telephone call from a subject national known to him and requesting a meeting at some specific time and place "on an urgent and delicate" matter should:

(1) Attempt to set the rendezvous at a restaurant or other public meeting place far removed from any of the Soviet Bloc official installations. Also the meeting place should be one of the recommended locations in Tehran, list of which will be published as an attachment to this instruction.

Attempt to set the time, on any pretext, at not less than two hours later.

(2) During duty hours, report immediately to the Embassy Security Officer and await instructions. During off-duty hours notify the Security Officer or the Embassy Duty Officer giving him the details as clearly but securely as possible. The latter should immediately arrange direct contact between the American Officer and CAS.

(3) Operational direction will pass to CAS.

G. Responsibilities.

1. The Embassy Security Officer is responsible for briefing and instruction of the Embassy receptionist, and of the Marine Guards. He will insure that the Embassy Duty Officer is cognizant of the contents of this memorandum and of the identity of senior CAS officers.

2. The Consul is responsible for briefing indigenous receptionists at the Consulate.

C. CAS is responsible for the briefing of the Embassy Security Officer, who in turn will brief each new Embassy Duty Officer as to the identity of the CAS officials and where they may be contacted during off-duty hours.

D. CAS is responsible for the management of a Subject after initial contact, and for all further arrangements.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION	
SECRET RYBAT		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chiefs of Station and Base	x	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO:		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief, SB Division		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: RYBAT REDTOP
Turning Around REDTOP Walk-ins

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Read and Retain for Reference

1. In recent months a number of REDTOP nationals have walked into LNBUZZ installations seeking political asylum. Most have eventually been processed as refugees or defectors and many of the latter have provided useful information. A substantial number have been persuaded to return to their homelands to work on our behalf and most of these are now of very great value as long-term in-place agents. In some cases, Stations have handled REDTOP walk-ins well; ~~in others~~, extremely valuable opportunities have been lost. These losses have generally resulted from misunderstandings in field Stations about WOMACE goals, priorities and capabilities and from difficulty in communicating with the walk-in. This dispatch and its attachments are designed to clarify our aims, to acquaint field Stations with BKHERALD abilities to exploit REDTOP walk-ins, and to enable officers to obtain essential information from REDTOP nationals with whom they have no common language.

2. Putting aside the question of LNBUZZ responsibilities for asylum seekers and for assistance to refugees, which have been covered elsewhere in dispatches and airgrams, we are here concerned only with individuals of intelligence interest. While defectors can and do provide critical information, there are very few cases in which the same individual would not have been of greater value if he had returned to his post and remained in place, at least for a reasonable period. A "turn-around" therefore should remain the first goal in handling a well-placed walk-in. In addition, normally with Headquarters guidance, an attempt should sometimes be made to turn around an individual who appears to be promising

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	Book Dispatch 8737	9 January 1973
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
SECRET RYBAT	Book Dispatch 8737

agent material even if, at the moment, he does not enjoy good access. If a young and personable walk-in with strong motivation but without immediate apparent access should walk in, we are prepared to guide and assist him in his career, running him in place until he develops the access we need. Most such walk-ins would qualify only as refugees, not defectors, which fact can be used as an argument in favor of turning around.

3. When we speak of turning the walk-in around to "work in place," we usually mean working in place after his return to his home country. Obviously, if a REDTOP official stationed in your area can be turned around, we would hope to exploit his position for intelligence purposes as long as he remains stationed outside REDTOP. Other than in exceptional cases, however, our ultimate objective is to have the walk-in return to his home country and continue his agent relationship while working inside.

4. BKHERALD can and does run many resident agents inside the REDTOP countries. We have the capability to mount and support such operations over an indefinite period, and we are currently able to exfiltrate agents, in most cases with their families, from the REDTOP countries when it is time for them to leave. To enable us successfully to turn walk-ins into resident REDTOP agents, however, ~~it is essential~~ that all BKHERALD officers who are likely to interview such persons should have some familiarity with our procedures; and it is equally essential that all field Stations have on hand the operational tools to obtain information necessary to Headquarters to enable us to recommend courses of action. In virtually all walk-in cases, the time available is extremely limited; unless the case officer obtains at least the minimum information necessary, unless Headquarters is notified immediately, and unless Headquarters can respond quickly with guidance, we may find that time has robbed us of the opportunity to turn the walk-in around. Field Stations must, therefore, be prepared to handle walk-in cases in which there may be no immediate opportunity of meeting again with the potential agent, as well as those in which planning may be somewhat more leisurely.

5. General procedures used in "turn-arounds" are perhaps best illustrated by outlining how typical cases have been handled recently when time available is relatively limited:

a. In the initial meeting the individual is debriefed by the Station or Base as to his motives, for biographic data and for necessary COI. If time permits, additional questions relating to areas of particular Station or Base interest could be included in this or subsequent debriefings prior to his departure.

b. Headquarters is informed of the situation and provided with all pertinent details by ~~immediate~~ or Flash cable precedence. In this respect a series of short cables will frequently be more efficient than one, more lengthy, cable. NIACT

c. Headquarters responds with guidance for both the Station or Base and the walk-in, including assignment of a particular SW receiving system. The walk-in is instructed in recovery of this SW system and an SW indicator is established. The walk-in is then told to return to his country and expect a letter (mailed

FORM 51-4 1401	USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT	CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

securely in his own country by a BKHERALD officer) containing an SW message with instructions approximately two to three months after his return.

d. Headquarters then assembles a package containing covert communications materials, reporting requirements and other instructions, which is deaddropped or otherwise securely delivered to the agent in his homeland.

e. An SW message is subsequently mailed internally to the walk-in giving him directions on how to retrieve the ops package.

6. The precise operational planning will vary, of course, with the situation; e.g., are the identity and access of the walk-in established, or is he an unknown quantity? Is this a crash operation in which our time with the walk-in is severely limited, or is there sufficient time to evolve a more sophisticated and efficient operational plan? The answers to these questions will help determine such questions as whether to handle him initially via indirect, non-personal communications, or whether to move him immediately into a communications plan involving more risky commitment of our REDTOP area staffers. If time permits and the replies to our questions so indicate, some turn-arounds may even be issued materials for preparing SW messages before they return to their homeland.

7. The most important single requirement to keep in mind in the crash situation is that we must have the walk-in's mailing address in his homeland. By that we mean an address at which he can securely receive internally posted mail; i.e., mail posted within his country. This might be his home address or the address of a friend or relative who would not be made suspicious by the arrival of mail for him. The most efficient method of acquiring this information is to have him address a sample envelope to himself in his own language, assuring him that this is merely an exemplar which will not itself be used. We also need to establish with the walk-in an SW indicator, perhaps a name or a phrase within the body of the open text, which will tell him that the letter contains SW. In its initial response, Headquarters will normally indicate if SW is authorized, and which of the SW receiving systems is to be issued. If there is insufficient time for consultation with Headquarters, do not hesitate to issue the scorch or water developed system to any promising walk-in. Under such circumstances, should a walk-in not be willing to accept either of these two systems, or if for any other reason they are not suitable, the station may also issue the microdot receiving system without prior approval from Headquarters.

8. In the case of the walk-in where circumstances give Headquarters more time to provide guidance and expertise, the handling will be somewhat different. If we have enough time and the individual has sufficient promise, we will probably dispatch a staff officer experienced in the communications systems we use in the REDTOP area to train him directly for these highly disciplined communications. In this case, we might do away completely with the initial letter mailed inside the REDTOP area to the agent and put him directly on personal communications. Where we have enough time, but are dealing with an unknown quantity, we would probably be inclined to take that time to probe his motivations and his suitability as agent material. This could be done through cabled communications with Headquarters, or might be handled through a dispatch of a TDY officer from Headquarters.

9. To facilitate walk-in debriefing in both the crash and less hurried situations, Attachment "A" contains copies of a questionnaire in English and the various REDTOP languages. A walk-in should be asked to complete this questionnaire in his own handwriting, printing the answers in capital letters. A transliteration table to Latin letters is provided for the CKPOLAR, VSYORK and YKBANK alphabets to allow accurate cabled reporting in his native language of an individual's responses. If desired, cables can be keyed to the attachment's numeration, by referring to this Dispatch. The questionnaire is divided into two Sections. Section I relates to the walk-in's current situation, status and biographic history. Section II requests basic OI information which would assist in clandestine communications planning. If time is available, the walk-in should be asked to fill out Section II only after Section I had been completed and Headquarters had authorized the Station to proceed. In promising situations, however, where time is short, stations are authorized to proceed with Section II on their own initiatives. The value of these questionnaires is that all necessary information may be obtained by an officer not fluent in the walk-in's native language. Further, it assures that the most pertinent questions will be asked even if the available time is limited and that, by virtue of the walk-in providing written answers to the questions, ambiguities and inaccuracies are considerably reduced.

10. Attachment "B" contains forms in English and the REDTOP languages to assist in the establishment of [redacted] communication with the walk-in. Included are questions concerning the individual's mailing address in his homeland and the type of mail he receives there, the establishment of an SW indicator, sets of instructions for the development or reading of several different agent SW receiving systems (including microdot) which do not require a specific developer, and SW carbon writing instructions. The agent-receiving instructions are accompanied by exemplars of developed messages and prepared messages which will enable the walk-in to practice developing if time and circumstances permit. Microdot receiving instructions include bullet lenses and exemplars of buried microdots. Practice SW carbons are provided with the SW carbon writing instructions. The foreign language versions are provided in two forms: on standard stationery, and in reduced printing on water soluble paper. The latter may be given the walk-in for subsequent study at his leisure; however, in no instance should he attempt to return to his country with these instructions.

11. The Attachment "B" instructions are more detailed than the standard WOLOCK forms intended for use primarily in conjunction with actual training by an SW technician. These expanded versions presuppose situations in which the attending case officer can provide little or no instructional assistance to the walk-in. However, it should be clearly understood that while these instructions are as comprehensive as possible their use cannot approach the effectiveness of training by a qualified SW instructor. In most cases where time and circumstances permit, we would prefer that a WOLOCK technician be called in to train the individual. By the same token, Chiefs of Station or Base should avail themselves of the opportunity, when a WOLOCK/CCB technician visits, to have case officers thoroughly trained in the use of the systems provided so that they can competently perform training if the need arises. As a minimum, all officers who might handle a walk-in should experiment with exemplars provided in Attachment "B". Additional copies for this purpose will be provided on request. All field operations officers should be completely familiar with these basic techniques.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET RYBAT	Book Dispatch 873

12. Analysis of REDTOP walk-ins in recent years clearly indicates that REDTOP services have not been using sophisticated and serious walk-ins as a provocation technique. However, fear of provocation has been more responsible for bad handling of walk-ins than any other cause. We have concluded that we do ourselves a real disservice if we shy away from promising cases because of fear of provocation. We are willing to run any apparently useful case for a reasonable period and can do so in such a way that little or no harm will be done if the case should turn out to be controlled. We are confident that we are capable of determining whether or not a producing agent is supplying bona fide information.

13. A legal matter involving "turn-around" inducement requires special comment. Many walk-ins and defectors appear to be adamant in their insistence on guaranteed resettlement in WODUAL; Stations are not authorized to make such promises on their own; and Headquarters is traditionally reluctant to grant such authority. In fact this problem is more apparent than real. An agent who serves us loyally "inside" for a reasonable period of time (normally several years) will obviously be well taken care of when he wishes to "retire" and competent field operations officers will normally be able to make this clear without specific promise of resettlement in WODUAL. "The West" or "a friendly country" are acceptable. As a last resort, however, Headquarters will consider making a commitment to WODUAL resettlement when a walk-in's value appears to justify it. However, Stations should make every possible effort to turn around all walk-ins without such a commitment.

14. One final problem which has caused some difficulty is the fact that traffic relating to a walk-in is not always received by interested Headquarters elements on a timely basis. To expedite handling, as well as to insure security, cable traffic should be slugged "RYBAT PLAERONAUT" and sent by at least Immediate precedence. Use of a higher precedence may be dictated by time considerations. At least during the initial exchanges, the cable should not carry the [redacted] indicator nor should there be any formal involvement with KONICK until approved by Headquarters. The PLAERONAUT slug will usually be used at least until all reasonable hope of turn-around is abandoned.

Robert P. Tacey

Robert P. TACEY

Attachments:
As stated

Keep on Top

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S-E-C-R-E-T

INSTRUCTION REGARDING WALK-INS

This memo covers the responsibilities of Station personnel in the event we are confronted with a Walk-In from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba or hard-target countries such as Iraq or Syria. As you are most probably aware, Walk-Ins, especially in the Soviet field, have provided the Agency with some of its most substantive and critical information. In the Soviet Bloc Division's experience with Soviet and Eastern European Walk-Ins outside the Bloc, there is no evidence that the KGB or GRU has used this device to run dangles or to attempt to surface Agency personnel and methods. The point is that Walk-Ins from these countries are generally legitimate and should be treated as such until proven otherwise. Professional judgement and handling will, of course, always be required. Please note that the Walk-In is just that and not a defector, no matter what he might say to you or what he feels his status is. Keep this in mind so that recruitment or turn-around is not foreclosed by automatically assenting to his statement that he is a defector.

Most likely you will be notified by either the Marine Guard, Duty Officer or Embassy Security Officer of the presence of a Walk-In on the Embassy or Consulate grounds. It is also conceivable that USIS or ARMISH/MAAG could be the point of contact. These officers have been instructed to notify us of the arrival of a possible Walk-In with the words "I have a message from Mr. MAYDAY" as well as the location of Mr. MAYDAY". The Marine Guards have also been told to notify COS, D/COS or Chief, Branch I. If none of these individuals is available, then he is to notify any Station Officer he knows. In all likelihood, by the time you arrive at the Embassy or Consulate, the Walk-In will be waiting with the Marine Guard or will be in the Embassy Library. You may then escort the individual to Room 113 in the Embassy (C/Branch I's cover office) or Room 404 in the Consulate, both of which have been

S-E-C-R-E-T

designated as secure enough for the initial debriefings. If, after meeting with the Walk-In, you determine that you and he have no common language, we have language material in the various Bloc, Russian and Chinese languages which includes the initial greeting in the individual's native tongue, debriefing material, and political asylum requests (these packets are kept in Chief, Branch I's safe in the top drawer and in DCOS' safe.) We also have a list of the local Embassy officials who have language capabilities related to our needs.

Obviously one can not predict nor list all the various difficulties and problems you might confront in your dealings with a Walk-In, such as the method used by which he contacts you or his mental and physicial condition at the time he walks in. However, the attached list will give you some guidelines and represents the minimal data you must acquire from the Walk-In.

A primary objective of the Station is recruitment in-place even if it is for a short period of time. This objective would pertain if the Walk-In is an intelligence officer or if he can be useful to the Agency as a source of information. Therefore:

A. Urge him to return to his Embassy or office (if he is a PCS Official). A useful justification is that you need time to move him out of the country. If he is agreeable, give him re-contact instructions (including time, meeting site and alternates) and specific requirements he should fulfill for the next meeting. Every officer should be thinking of a secure area or site for this specific eventuality.

B. If he agrees to working in-place but is here TDY and will soon be moving on, the following are imperative:

   1) Determine his address in his homeland where he can receive mail and have him address an envelope himself, letter to be mailed in his country.
   2) Establish with the Walk-In an SW indicator, perhaps a name or phrase within the body of the open text of the letter which will tell him that the letter contains SW.

3) He must also be informed as to the method used in developing SW (scorch or water developed system instructions are attached). If there is insufficient time for consulations with Headquarters regarding SW issuance, do not hesitate to give scorch or water developed system instructions to any promising Walk-In.

4) Determine if he has American or Western friends or relatives with whom he corresponds in the West or any friends or relatives traveling in the West or who are likely to travel.

If he does not agree to work in-place or circumstances preclude the possibility of this, place him in an area where locals do not have access until a determination can be made of his case (possibilities include the small room with toilet facilities next to the photo lab on the Embassy compound or as a last resort, one of the Embassy apartments). The Walk-In must have a Station officer with him at all times.

Send immediate cable to Headquarters with all pertinent data. If the Walk-In is from a local Embassy, check to see if Station has a 201 file and if so, forward information from it to Headquarters. Follow this up with whatever information becomes available from the debriefing.

If the Walk-In does want to defect, you cannot promise him anything but you can assure him that his case will be sympathetically handled. You should at that time obtain a asylum request from him, preferably in his own words and handwriting (the outline of these requests in the various languages are available in the Chief, Branch I's safe and DCOS' safe).

If the Walk-In falls under defector status, is an intelligence officer or of specific interest to Headquarters we may prepare to move him out of the country as soon as is possible. If the Walk-In does not fit this status and can not be used operationally, the Embassy Defector Committee will be convened at COS direction to determine whether to grant defector status. If the walk-In is an intelligence officer or can be used operationally, the Defector Committee will not be convened or informed.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF A SECRET WRITING (SW) CARBON

(READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS VERY CAREFULLY)

1. The Secret Writing (SW) Carbon

A secret writing (SW) carbon appears to be ordinary writing paper. However, this spe paper works exactly like a carbon paper used in a typewriter in that under the pressure o pencil, an invisible ink is transferred from the carbon to the paper on which it rests. There four main differences between the typewriter carbon and the SW carbon: 1) the special ink the SW carbon is invisible and there is only a very small amount of it, 2) both sides of the carbon are impregnated with this special ink so you may use either side, 3) with proper stor and careful handling, the SW carbon can be used for as many as 30 messages, and 4) only we be able to read what you have written. By using this SW carbon to write messages, you will h a very secure means of communicating with us.

You must ensure that the SW carbon does not become soiled or confused with other pi of paper. When you handle the carbon, be sure that your hands are clean and hold it only the edges. Store the carbon in a safe place where you can find it and where it will not beco dirtied. To more easily recognize the carbon, you might write something innocent such as sm notes, telephone numbers, addresses, etc., **on one side of it.**

2. Preparation of the Open Letter

Almost any normal writing stationery on which you would consider writing a personal let can be used. The best type is the white non-glazed variety which is neither too thick nor too th

Place the sheet of paper on which you will write the letter on a clean surface. With a cle soft cloth such as a handk hief, gently wipe the paper from left to right across the paper maki overlapping wipes until yo have completely wiped the paper left to right from the top to bottom. Then rotate the paper 90° and wipe in the same manner. Continue wiping and rotat the paper until it has been completely wiped in all four directions. Then turn the paper o and wipe the back of the sheet in the same way. This wiping will raise the paper fibres and m the paper more receptive to the secret ink.

Compose a letter similar in style and form to that of any letter you would write to a relat or friend. This letter should only concern affairs which would be of no interest to outsiders a should not contain topics which would arouse the curiosity or suspicion on the part of anyo who might read the letter. However, the letter must be of substance. The best way to judge whet or not the letter you have written is good is to ask yourself, "Is this letter worth the postage send it?" If the answer is "yes" it is a good letter. Write the letter with a ballpoint pen on a cle soft surface such as a writing pad.

IMPORTANT

A. **Do not** write about anything in the letter which would identify you as the sender.

B. **Do not** sign your real name. Instead use a fictitious name and continue to use the sa fictitious name on all future letters to the same address.

C. **Do not** use a return name or address on the envelope.

D. **Do not** mail the letter in the same postal district or zone that you normally send receive mail.

E. **Do not** mail the letter in a post office. Instead use a street mailbox, preferably at a t when no one else can see you do it.

3. Preparation of the Secret Message

Wash your hands thoroughly before beginning. You are to write your secret message o across the **front** of the letter in the **same direction** as the visible text. The visible text will interfere with our reading the message.

The writing of the SW message must be done in the following manner (please note the corresponding illustration):

A. Place a piece of clean white paper (A) on a clean hard surface (preferably glass).

B. Place the letter (B) on this paper with the front side facing up.

C. Place the SW carbon (C) on the letter. If you have written anything on one side of the SW carbon to disguise it, be sure to place the clean side of the carbon without writing against the letter.

D. On top of the carbon place one more piece of clean white paper (D). This is the sheet on which you will write.

E. Align (trim up) all four pieces of paper along the bottom and along the left hand side. Prevent the pieces of paper from moving while you are writing the message by lightly pressing down in the margins of the paper. Do not press down in the area in which you will write the secret message.

F. For writing, use a blunt pencil with a medium soft lead (a pencil with a hard lead will leave noticeable impressions). While writing the SW message do no press down with such force that you will make impressions on the letter. Use a firm, uniform pressure. Leave a margin of about 2 cm on all sides. The SW message should be written in block letters about 5 mm high. In place of a period, make a small "X" where the period would normally be. If a word is particularly important, such as a name or number, you should write it twice. Write it the first time followed by the word "REPEAT" then write it a second time. At the end of the SW message, write "END".

G. After finishing the SW message, destroy the top sheet of paper (D) and conceal the SW carbon (C) in a secure place for future use. Very carefully inspect both sides of the letter (B) for any impressions from the writing of the SW message. To do this, hold the letter above eye level at an angle to a light (please note the corresponding illustration) and rotate the letter slightly from side to side and up and down. If you find impressions of the SW message, you must destroy this letter and begin again using lighter pressure.

H. Since you must destroy any letters on which you make visible impressions when writing the secret message, before writing each message please practice in the following manner: assemble four sheets of paper as shown in the illustration, but instead of using an actual letter and the SW carbon, use clean sheets of paper. Write a sentence exactly as you would when preparing a secret message but with lighter pressure, then another with slightly heavier pressure. Continue to write sentences, increasing the pressure with each. Examine sheet "B" in the light. You should use the heaviest pressure possible which does not leave impressions. This is because the SW carbon is somewhat less sensitive than the normal typewriter carbon.

I. When you are completely satisfied that there are no impressions of the pencil writing on the actual letter, again wash your hands and then carefully fold the letter in the normal fashion and put it into an envelope. You must be careful not to directly touch any portion of the letter which contains the secret message with your fingers or the secret writing might smear. You may place a clean piece of paper between your fingers and the secret message when folding the letter, but do not accidentally enclose this blank piece of paper in the envelope.

4. Precautionary Measures

A. Never put the open letter in contact with the SW carbon until you are ready to write the actual secret message. Handle the SW carbon and the letters only by the edges and do not fold or handle them unnecessarily.

B. Do not make corrections or try to erase mistakes in the SW message. Instead write "MISTAKE" after the incorrect word and then write the correct word.

C. Prepare a complete draft of your message in exactly the same format as the secret message. In this way you will be able to make any necessary corrections in advance, before writing the actual secret message. Also, by having a draft to copy from you will be able to pay more attention to your writing technique and thus make no mistakes

D
C
B
A

DEVELOPMENT OF SECRET MESSAGES WITH WATER

The secret messages we will send you will be on the back side of the letter and written
right angles to the open text. This message will contain additional instructions for you.

Development of the secret messages can be accomplished in number of ways. The most pr
tical is to place the letter in a clean tray free of soap, oil or grease of ordinary water until t
message appears as transparent letters on an opaque background. If the letter is left in the wa
for too long a time the secret message will become blurred. Remove it from the water as so
as the secret message is completely legible. Place it face up on a clean piece of white paper
read the message.

Messages developed with ordinary water are legible only while wet and will disappear as t
paper dries. However, the messages can be redeveloped a minimum of four times without lo
of legibility.

If fountain pen ink is added to the water in the tray, the developed secret message will
permanent and not fade when the paper has dried. In this case the secret message will appear
dark letters on a lighter background.

After you have read the secret message and made necessary notes, be sure to destroy
completely.

PRECAUTION: Wet paper tears very easily. Exercise great care when handling the w
message.

DEVELOPMENT OF SECRET MESSAGES BY SCORCH

The secret messages we will send you will be repeated at least once. The front and back side
of the letter will each have at least one copy of the entire secret message. Thus you will have
at least two chances to read the entire message if you encounter any difficulty. The secret message
will be at right angles to the open text. It will contain additional instructions for you.

The secret message will develop slowly under the influence of high heat. The message will
darken faster than the paper background. Heating must be continued until the message is com-
pletely legible. Suggested techniques are as follows:

1. **Do not use direct flames** as the source of heat because of the danger of the paper igniting.
If a gas stove is to be used, it is suggested that a clean frying pan be placed over the open flame
to provide a surface similar to a hot plate. The message can probably be most easily developed over
an electric hot plate or stove. When the unit is at its hottest, the message sheet should be held
above the heating surface until the paper turns brown and the message appears.

2. A flat iron or an electric iron may also be used conveniently as the source of heat. In this
case the message is pressed with a very hot iron. The iron should be moved very slowly back
and forth over the message sheet until the secret writing appears.

After you have read the secret message and made necessary notes, be sure to completely
destroy it.

SECRET COMMUNICATIONS

About two to three months after you return to your country you will receive a letter writt in your native language mailed within your country. Please write your mailing address in t space below in the same manner as you would address an envelope to you.

What kinds of letter or written material can you normally receive at this mailing address?

This letter will have an indicator which means that the letter contains a secret message f you. The indicator could be the name of the person who signs the letter, a phrase or senten in the text of the letter, the way in which the letter is dated, etc. The indicator must be somethi that you can easily remember and recognize but which would be innocent to anyone else wh might read it. Please write the indicator you want to use for this purpose in the space belo

СЕКРЕТНЫЕ СООБЩЕНИЯ

Два или три месяца после того как Вы вернетесь в Советский Союз, Вы получите написанное по-русски письмо посланное из Москвы. Пожалуйста, напишите в данном внизу месте Ваш точный почтовый адрес

Какие письма или написанные материалы можете-ли Вы нормально получать по этому адресу?

В этом посланном из Москвы письме будет дан индикатор объясняющий Вам что в нем находится секретное сообщение для Вас. Этим индикатором может быть или имя человека подписывающего письмо, или фраза или выражение в тексте письма, и.т.д. Этот индикатор должен быть легко запомнен и узнан Вами, но также должен быть не обращающим на себя внимания если бы кто-нибудь другой читал его. Пожалуйста, предложьте в данном внизу месте индикатор которым мы могли бы пользоваться в письмах к Вам.

WALK-IN CHECK LIST

1. Determine full name, including patronymic (Note: If Walk-In is initially reluctant to give name, come back to it after establishing some rapport).

2. Date, place of birth; immediate family - names, DPOB.

3. His exact position.

4. Local address and telephone number.

5. Address and telephone number in native country.

6. Obtain any documents or identification papers he might have with him in order to determine bona fides (photograph if possible).

7. How long can he remain before he will be missed.

8. Determine if he is an Intelligence Officer. If so, determine his alias, basic information on the residency, knowledge of operations against American target in area and elsewhere, other Intelligence Officers and Agents in the area and elsewhere.

9. Debrief him for indications intelligence: early warning information on imminent hostilities against the U.S., its installations, and Allies.

10. Determine membership in Communist Party.

11. Determine exact motivation for coming to us: asylum, working-in place, assistance, protection, or in fact is he here for some completely innocent purpose?

12. Determine if he has told anyone of his plans for coming to us, whether his family is with him, and whether he has made any such approaches elsewhere.

13. If Walk-In is a PCS Intelligence Officer or government official, aim immediately for recruitment-in-place, and urge him to return to his Embassy or office (a useful justification is that the USG needs time to decide his case or to move him out of the country). If he is agreeable to recruitment-in-place, provide requirements.

14. If Walk-In is TDYer and agrees to working-in-place:

    (a) have him print his address in his homeland where he can receive mail, and then have him address an envelope himself;

    (b) establish an SW indicator (name or phrase);

    (c) issue and explain carefully scorch or water-developed SW system, and explain that a letter with further instructions in SW will be mailed to him from inside his country;

    (d) determine if he has any American or Western friends/relatives living or travelling in the West now or in the future, and whether he knows anyone in the West who can vouch for him.

15. Re-contact:

    (a) For asylum-seekers: return to Embassy in 2 day's time, if possible; if not, arrange outside meeting.

    (b) For recruitment-in-place: arrange outside meeting in public place (site, date, time, alternates, and recognition signals).

    (c) For TDYer: attempt to arrange outside meeting-in-place.

16. Description: height, weight, apparent age, eyes, hair, complexion, teeth, clothes, posture, speech.

17. Money: if Walk-In is in need of money, issue a reasonable amount for sustenance until re-contact.

The information that you provide about yourself on this questionnaire will be seen only by appropriate U.S. Government officials and will be handled most discreetly as confidential information.

At this time there is an officer present who speaks your language fluently. Please show any documents you have with you which would establish your identity to the person who has given you these instructions. This person may wish to keep your documents for a short time for the usual verification, but they will be returned to you before you leave today.

Please write (in numbers) the time you must leave here today: _____ hrs. If it is possible for you to come here again, give in numbers, the date and time you expect to return here:

Please fill out the following questionnaire so that we may be able to better assist you. Please print your answers in capital letters. If you need more space, write on the back of the page

SECTION I

1. Your full name:

2. Place and date of birth:

3. Citizenship:

4. Occupation:

5. Complete permanent address and home telephone number:

6. What is your address in the city/country where we now are?

7. If it is necessary for us to contact you during the next few days, how can this be done?

8. If you travelling, when will you leave this city? Give dates and places you plan to visit nex
When do you plan to return to your country?

9. What languages do you [illegible]k, read and write? Please list your languages in order of fluency
your most fluent first, [illegible] least fluent last:

10. To whom do you wish to speak and what is it that you wish to discuss? How may we help you?

11. Give the full name and address of your place of work. Explain the functions, production of the enterprise, and its subordination relationship to higher organizations.

12. Describe your current work. What is your job title? Who is the head of your enterprise/plant/ ministry?

13. In your work do you have access to secret information or documents? If so, what? Describe any access you have had to secret information before your present job.

14. Briefly, what is the level of your education and in what field?

15. If you have had military service during the past 10 years, give rank, branch of service, unit designation and duties performed.

16. Are you a member of a Communist Party or related organization? Give dates of membership and positions held.

17. If you have ever worked for or had any contacts with any intelligence service, describe circumstances, dates, names of persons and places, and the exact nature of activity.

18. What is your present status? Are you travelling as a tourist alone or in a group? Are you on an official trip? If you have a passport for foreign travel, what visa or travel permits do you have and for what period of time and countries are they valid?

19. Are any members of your family with you in this country? If so, give names, dates of birth and relationship to you.

ОБЪЯСНЕНИЕ (без переводчика)

Те сведения о себе, которые вы сообщите на приложенной здесь анкете будут показаны только уместным должностным лицам в правительстве Соединенных Штатов и с этими сведениями обращаться наиболее осмотрительно как подобает секретным сведениям.

В данный момент у нас нет здесь служащих которые говорили бы на вашем языке свободно. Пожалуйста, покажите все имеющиеся у вас документы которые удостоверят вашу личность человеку который дал вам это объяснение. Он, возможно задержит ваши документы на короткое время для обычной проверки их достоверности, но они будут возвращены вам до вашего ухода отсюда, сегодня.

Пожалуйста, напишите цифрами время в которое вы должны уйти отсюда, сегодня: _____ ч. Если для вас будет возможным прийти сюда опять, то напишите цифрами дату и время когда вы сможете это сделать: _____.

Пожалуйста, заполните приложенную здесь анкету, чтобы мы смогли лучше помочь вам и пожалуйста, пишите печатными буквами (без заглавных). Если вам понадобится больше места для писания, то используйте оборотную сторону страницы.

I

1. Имя, отчество, и фамилия:

2. Место и дата рождения:

3. Гражданство:

4. Профессия/занятие:

5. Полный домашный адрес и номер телефона:

6. Ваш адрес в этом городе или в этой стране:

7. Если будет необходимо связаться с вами в ближайшие несколько дней, как можно
сделать?

8. Если вы сейчас находитесь в пути, когда вам нужно выезжать из этого города? Укажи
даты и места ваших следующих остановок. Когда вы возвращаетесь в вашу страну?

9. На каких языках вы говорите, читаете, и пишите? Пожалуйста, перечислите ваши язы
в порядке наилучшего знания—ваш лучший язык первым, последним напишите в
самый слабый язык

10. С кем бы вы хотели говорить и о чем? Чем можем помочь вам?

11. Укажите полностью название и адрес вашего места работы. Опишите функции и продукцию вашего предприятия и его подчинение или связь с вышестоящими организациями.

12. Опишите вашу работу. Как называется ваша работа? Кто является начальником вашего предприятия/фабрики/министерства?

13. В вашей работе, имеется-ли у вас доступ к секретным сведениям или документам? Если ответ утвердительный, то к каким именно? Опишите если у вас был такой доступ в прошлом, до теперешней работы.

14. Сообщите вкратце о ваших образовании и специализации.

15. Если вы были на военной службе в течение последних 10-и лет, то сообщите ваше звание, род войск, наименование части и служебные обязанности за время вашей службы.

16. Состоите-ли вы членом коммунистической партии или ее какой-либо родственной организации? Укажите даты и должности за период когда состояли членом.

17. Если вы когда-либо работали или имели связь с любой разведочной службой/организ
ацией, то опишите при каких условиях, когда (даты), имена и фамилии лиц и назван
мест с которыми имели связь и аккуратное описание того, что вы делали.

18. Какое ваше положени в настоящее время—вы путешествуете как турист самостоятель
или с группой? Нахо есь-ли вы сейчас в официальной/служебной поездке? Если у в
имеется паспорт дл ездки заграницу, какие визы разрешения у вас есть и на как
время и для каких стран они действительны?

19. Кто из членов вашей семьи находится с вами здесь в этой стране? Также укажите
имена, даты рождения и их родство с вами.

SECTION II

1. Do you expect to travel outside your country within the next year or two? Where? When? For what purpose?

2. If you do not live in your capital city, how frequently could you travel there?

3. Do you have relatives or friends living outside the Socialist countries? Gives names, addresses and relationship to you.

4. Please write your mailing address in the same manner as you would address an envelope to yourself.

5. Describe the kinds of personal mail you receive at your mailing address. About how many letters per month do you receive from within your country? From outside your country? Do you receive magazines, books, or commercial literature through the mails? From where?

6. Do you receive mail via general delivery? If so, write out [illegible] address.

7 What Western publications, newspapers or magazines can you read regularly in your country?

8 Regarding your residence in your country: who lives with you and what is their relationship to you? Describe briefly your residence and number of rooms. On what floor of the building is it located? Is mail addressed to you put in a mailbox in your building? If so, where is the box located? Is your name or apartment number written on the box?

9. Do you have an automobile? Give the model, color and license number

10 Please give the name, model and year of manufacture of any short wave radio and television set you have.

11. What photographic equipment do you have? Do you develop film at home?

II

1 Ожидаете-ли вы возможность путешествия за пределы вашей страны, в следующие год или два? Куда? Когда? За какой цели?

2 Если вы не живете в вашей столице, то как часто у вас бывает возможность ездить туда?

3 Есть ли у вас родственники или знакомые вне социалистических стран? Укажите их имена и фамилии, адреса и родство или отношения к вам.

4 Пожалуйста, напишите ваш почтовый адрес так, как вы адресовали бы конверт письма к себе.

5 Опишите род/тип писем которые вы получаете по вашему почтовому адресу. Приблизительно сколько писем вы получаете в месяц, внутри вашей страны? А из мест вне пределов вашей страны? Получаете-ли вы журналы, книги, или деловую литературу по почте и откуда?

6 Получаете-ли вы письма до востребования? Если ответ утвердительный, то напишите полностью этот адрес.

7. Какие из западных изданий, газет или журналов вы можете читать регулярно в вашей стране?

8. О вашем проживании в вашей стране: кто живет с вами и какое у них родство с вами? Опишите вкратце вашу квартиру и количество комнат. На каком этаже она находится? Кладется-ли почта для вас в ящик для почты в вашем здании? Если да, то где этот ящик расположен? Написаны-ли ваши фамилия и номер квартиры на этом ящике?

9. Имеется-ли у вас автомобиль? Укажите модель, цвет и номер вашей машины.

10. Пожалуйста, укажите марку, модель и год выпуска коротковолнового радиоприемника и телевизора которые у вас может быть имеются.

11. Какое фото-оборудование есть у вас? Проявляете-ли вы пленки дома?

Form IV

政治庇護申請書

本人姓____名_____年____月____日生於_____國____省____縣

現任職於_____

茲因不滿中共現政權決意選擇自由特向美利堅聯邦政府申請予以政治庇護務希核准為荷

_____謹具

____年___月___日

Please copy the preceding statement in your own handwriting on this paper and sign it.

请你把上面的政治庇护申请书抄下来并在上面签字.

Form V

It is our understanding that you desire political asylum in the United States. We are definitely willing to help you, but since there is no one here now who can speak Chinese we are unable to discuss this with you fully. We, therefore, ask that you return to your Embassy at once while we cable for an official who speaks Chinese to fly here.

We realize that you would prefer not to go back to your Embassy, but we ask you to return quickly and calmly and, if questioned, give an acceptable answer to explain your absence to your superiors. Continue your normal work calmly.

During the next week please write a letter outlining your reasons for requesting asylum, the nature of your work, and the exact details of your normal business and recreational trips outside the Embassy. We will need to know when you normally leave the Embassy, where you go, and with whom in order to safely plan how to contact you. If you believe you can securely make a 15-minute visit to our Embassy within the next two weeks, please also include the approximate date and time we can expect your visit.

Put your letter in this already addressed and stamped envelope. Keep it in a safe place and mail it as soon as you can without being observed.

You have taken the important first step in seeking freedom and asylum. As soon as we have verified your identity and sincerity, we will begin planning with you the safest way to arrange your escape. Please be assured that you have made a correct decision and that we will help you fully the rest of the way.

Form VI

What kind of work do you do in the Chinese Peoples Republic Embassy?
你在中华人民共和国大使馆担任那一项工作？

Research and investigation work in political and economic matters? 调查和研究政治经济工作？	Yes 是	No 不是
Research and investigation work in cultural matters? 调查和研究文化工作？	Yes 是	No 不是
Research and investigation work in scientific matters? 调查和研究科学工作？	Yes 是	No 不是
Translation work? 翻译工作？	Yes 是	No 不是
Accounting and bookkeeping? 会计和簿记工作？	Yes 是	No 不是
Receiving and distributing official documents from Peking? 收发由北京来的公文？	Yes 是	No 不是
Commercial work? 商务工作？	Yes 是	No 不是
Typing and/or secret code work? 打字密码工作？	Yes 是	No 不是
Translation and research work for the NCNA Office? 替新华社做翻译和研究工作？	Yes 是	No 不是
Are you a cook in the Embassy? 你是使馆的厨师吗？	Yes 是	No 不是
Do you work as a chauffeur, housecleaner, or gardener? 你是担任司机，园丁或打扫工作吗？	Yes 是	No 不是

What is the name of your Section Chief?
你工作部门的主管人什么名字？

Are you a member of the CCP/Investigation Department Unit in the Embassy? 你是党的调查部派驻使馆的人员吗？	Yes 是	No 不是
Do you know the members of the CCP/Investigation Department in the Embassy? 你是不是知道使馆里有调查部的人员？	Yes 知道.	No 不知道

Are you a member of the PLA/Intelligence Department In the Embassy? Yes No
你是解放军情报部派驻使馆的人员吗？ 是 不是

Do you know the members of the PLA/Intelligence Department in the Embassy? Yes No
你是不是知道使馆里有情报部的人员？ 知道 不知道

Do you work for the International Liaison Department? Yes No
你是管国际联络部工作吗？ 是 不是

Are you a Chinese Communist Party member? Yes No
你是中国共产党党员吗？ 是 不是

Do you attend briefings given by the Ambassador or the Political Counselor? Yes No
你参加大使或"政务参赞"的会报吗？ 参加 不参加

Can you go into the Code Room (or Secret Room) to read documents and telegrams? Yes No
你能不能到机要室去阅[illegible]文或电报？ 能 不能

When were you scheduled to return to China for home leave or reassignment?
什么时候轮到你回国休假或另调其他职务？

This month_____ Next month_____ Later this year_____ Next year_____
本月内 下个月 今年年底以前 明年

Have you recently been criticized by your superiors in the Embassy? Yes No
你最近被使馆的上级同志批评过吗？ 批评过 没有

For what reason were you criticized?
为什么原因被批评？

Unsatisfactory political attitude? Yes No
政治态度不正确？ 是 不是

Bourgeois tendencies or behavior? Yes No
有小资产阶级的倾向或行为？ 是 不是

Mistakes in your work? Yes No
工作上的错误？ 是 不是

Now that you are more relaxed will you begin writing a resume of your personal history. In this statement you should include all details of your education, work experience, CCP experience. Also include the names, locations, and occupations of all of your family members. In a second statement write a complete report of all of your duties at the Chinese Peoples Embassy since you arrived there.
现在你的心情比较安定了，可以开始写一篇简略的自传。这篇自传必须包括你的教育，工作经验和党的历史等。此外还要你全体家属的姓名，地址和职业。另外请你写一篇报告说明你从到使馆以后的工作情况。

Since it will be very useful for you to learn the English language, this person will begin to teach you. We have no teaching materials in Chinese so you will be taught by the direct method.
学习英文对你将有很大的帮助，因此我们请这位先生教你英文，可是我们没有中文的教材，所以只好用直接的方法来教你。

Do you feel ill? Do you want to see a doctor? Yes No
你是不是不舒服？要不要看医生 要 不要

Form VII

Other useful phrases and instructions.

Please sit in this chair. We are going to photograph you
请坐在这把椅子上，我们给你照一张相。

We are going to take you to a safe place where you will remain for several days while arrangements are being made to take you out of this country. The house is safe and you will be protected. An American will remain with you at all times and will help you if you need help. Follow his instructions and do not try to leave the building without his permission. You will be supplied with things to make your stay as comfortable as possible. After several days an American who speaks Chinese will come here to help you and to escort you out of this count
我们要把你带到一个安全的地方去，同时要作种种安排使你能离开这个国家。我们带你去的地方是很安全的，你将受到保护。在那里有一个美国人同你在一起，照顾你，帮助你，请你听从他的指示，没有他的同意不要离开我们给你准备好一切必需品，尽量使你生活舒适，你将在那里住几天，几天后，一位会讲中国话的美国人就会护送你离开这个国家。

We are going to disgui you so that you will not be recognized when we go outside of this ilding. After we have finished the disguise and are leaving the building, follow closely the instructions of the person who is escorting you.
我们要给你化装一下，使你出去的时候别人不认识你，你离开这个房子的时候我们派人护送你，请你注意听从他的指示。

Do not try to take your suitcase with you. Take only the essential things which you can carry in your pockets and leave the remainder of your possessions here. They will be safeguarded for you.
你的东西暂时不要带去，只带一些十分需要的放在口袋里，其余的暂时放在这里，由我们替你保管。

Hello. I am an official at this American Embassy. I regret that neither I nor anyone presently in this Embassy speaks Chinese, but we have anticipated this problem and will try to communicate with you using these cards, written in your language.

Next: 2

您好！
我是本使馆的职员，很对不起，馆内现在没有能讲中国话的。
可是，为了解决这个问题，我们特地预备了一套中文卡片，来跟您笔谈。

2

Please write your surname and given names here.

Directions: If name is written in romanized for go to card 3.
If name is written in Chinese characters, go t card 4.

请您在这里写您的姓名：

3

Please write your name in Chinese.

Directions: Go to card 4.

请用中文写您的姓名：

4

Are you a citizen of the People's Republic of China?

YES. NO

If yes, go to card 5. If no, stop

您是中华人民共和国的人民吗

如是请指明「是」。 是 YES

如不是请指明「不是」 不是 NO

5

I will need some information about you. Be assured that your information will be treated confidentially and will be held within this Embassy.

Next: 6

现在我想问一下关于您本身的问题，我们绝对保密，请您放心。

6

Please show me any documents you have with you that identify you.

Directions: If you wan to leave the room with the documents, use card Otherwise, go to 8.

请您给我看看您的证明文件。

7

Please wait. I have to show these documents to my superior, and I will bring them back to you immediately.

Next: 8

请您稍候。我须要把这些文件交给上级看看，馬上就交还您。

8

Are you a member of the PRC Embassy?

YES

If yes,
use card 9

NO

If no,
use card 11

您是中华人民共和国大使馆馆员吗？

如是请指明「是」 是 YES

如不是请指明「不是」 不是 NO

9

Are stationed in this city?

YES

If yes, go to card 10

NO

If no, go to card 15

您是不是派驻在本城的？

如是请指明「是」 是 YES

如不是请指明「不是」 不是 NO

10

Please write down approximately when your tour of duty is scheduled to end.

Year_____ Month_____ Day_____

Next: 18

请您注明您的任期到何时为止：

年 _____ 月 _____ 日 _____

YEAR MONTH DAY

11

Are you a member of a Chinese trade delegation visiting this country?

YES	NO
If yes, go to 16	If no, go to 12

您是不是来访问的中国商业代表团的团员？

如是请指明「是」 是 YES

如不是请指明「不是」 不是 NO

12

Are you a member of a Chinese cultural delegation visiting this country?

YES — If yes, go to 16

NO — If no, go to 13

您是不是来访问的中国文化代表团的团员？

如是请指明「是」 是 YES

如不是请指明「不是」 不是 NO

13

Are you travelling here as a PRC official?

YES — If yes, go to 16

NO — If no, go to 14

您是不是以中华人民共和国官员的身份来的？

如是请指明「是」 是 YES

如不是请指明「不是」 不是 NO

14

Please write your occupation and your address below.

Next: 15 or 16

请您将您的职务，住址写明在这里

15

Please indicate on this map where you are stationed.

Next: 17

请您在这地图上指出您派驻的地点：

16

Please indicate on this map your entire travel route.

Next: 17

请您在这地图上，注明您旅行全程路线。

17

Please use this calendar and the timepiece (clock or watch) to indicate the time and date you must leave this city.

请您用这日历和钟表，指出您必须离开本城的日期及时间。

18

Please indicate your official position from this list.
If your position is not on this list, please write it below.

Next: Use LIST

After LIST, go card 19.

请您在这名單上，指出您的职位，
如果名單上没有，请您把它写在下面

19

Please indicate why you have come here.

If "other" go to 20, otherwise go to 23.

请问您来这里是不是为：

商务问题	Commercial matter
文化方面	Cultural matter
签证问题	Visa matter
私人访问	Personal visit
意外协助	Accident assistance
其他问题	Other

20

eking help of a political nature?

YES

If yes, go to 22

NO

If no, go to 21

您是不是想寻求政治上的帮助？

是
YES

不是
NO

21

Please indicate what you want in your own writing.

Next: 23

请您写下来您所需要的是什么？

22

I admire your courage in coming here and I agree that you have made a wise decision.

We are going to help you to the limits of possibility.

I represent our Government when I assure you that we will assist you.

Next: 2

我敬佩您有勇气到这里来，我以为您的决定是很明智的。

我们一定尽量地帮助您。

我代表我们政府向您保证，我们会帮助您的。

23

We have no American officials here now who can speak Chinese. We will have an American official who speaks Chinese come here. This will take, at most, two days. As soon as he arrives, we will discuss what you want with you.

If you want him to return to the Embassy use 24.
If not, use 25 plus your own recontact plan.

目前我们使馆里没有人能说中国话，不过我们在两天以内，就可以调来一位会说中国话的官员，等他一到，我们就能和您详谈了。

24

You should return to your place and continue your work.
We need two days to have a Chinese-speaking American officer transferred here. In 3 to 5 days you may return here, during the hours between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. If you find this difficult, please come here at your convenience. After you return here we can discuss the details of your request for assistance.

If not "political assistance," end with 27. If "political assistance" go to 26.

您现在应该回到您原来的地方，继续工作。我们需要两天的时间，去找一位会说中国话的美国官员到这里来。

您可以在三五天以内，从上午九点到下午五点这段时间内再来。如果有困难，请您自己斟酌时间再来，那时我们再和您详谈如何来帮助您。

25

What you must do now is to return to your place and perform your normal duties.
We will need two full days to bring a Chinese-speaking American official here.
Next time, do not come here to the American Embassy. Follow these directions.

Next: 26.

您现在请先回去照常工作。我们需要两天的时间去找一位会说中国话的美国官员到这里来。

请您下次不要到美国大使馆来，请按照这些指示去做。

26

We will not report this visit to your government or to the local government. Please do not tell anyone about your visit to us.
Return to your place quickly, do your work calmly, and come again after two days have passed.

Next: end with 27

我们不会报告你们政府和当地政府，说您来过这里。请您也不要告诉任何人您来过这里。
请您赶快回去，镇定地工作，两天以后，再来这里。

27

Please come with me. I will take you to an exit.

LAST CARD

Make sure you have collected all the cards.
Get up to leave.

我现在送您出去，请您跟我来。

POL file
Uftorn
Pol-30

SECRET/NOFORN

November 10, 1973

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT Handling of Asylum Requests by Citizens of Communist Countries (USSR, Peoples Republic of China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, Albania, Yugoslavia, Cuba, N. Korea, N. Vietnam)

1. Our country is by tradition sympathetic to those who seek to escape from tyranny, and it is the express policy of the U.S. Government to give prompt and full consideration to requests for asylum wherever they may be made. Moreover, persons asking for asylum or seeking to establish a secret connection with the U.S. Government are often able to provide information of great value. Accordingly, both humanitarian considerations and the interests of the Government require the Embassy and the other elements of the official American Community in Iran to be prepared to handle requests for asylum efficiently and securely.

2. This memorandum (which supersedes the memorandum of December 1, 1972 on the same subject) explains what to do when a citizen of one of the communist countries turns to any U.S. Government employee in Iran with a request that the U.S. Government give him refuge, help, or protection from his own authorities. It also explains how to handle persons who approach official Americans to say, for example, that they have "important information for the U.S. Government" or that they have a "confidential matter" that they wish to discuss with the Ambassador or some other American official.

3. Of course, some requests for asylum and stories about "important information" are fraudulent; they may be made by pranksters or cranks; or they may be the work of con men or even of the agents of hostile intelligence services who want to discover our procedures and who our own intelligence people are. But it is better to accept several phony requests than to turn down a single genuine one. No one must be sent away just because he behaves oddly or his story sounds improbable. Many stories which initially sounded implausible have proven true.

4. There are a number of ways in which a person seeking asylum or assistance may get in touch with the American authorities, and they will be taken up below. In all cases, however, it is the duty of the American to whom the asylum or assistance request is first made to receive it with courtesy and sympathy [illegible] to give the requester protection or whatever immediate help the circumstances may warrant. Above all, it is the American's responsibility as explained below, to alert the proper authorities without delay, regardless of when the asylum request may be made. This means that even if the request is received after duty hours or on a holiday, action must still be taken on it at once, and not put off till the next working day. A further point: the person seeking asylum or a confidential interview may indeed have classified information of great value to the Government. To protect him and his information, therefore, his identity and the fact of his asylum or assistance request must, to the extent possible, be revealed to no one other than the proper U.S. Government authorities, as set forth below.

5. Someone seeking asylum or assistance is most likely to come in person to the Embassy or the Consulate, either during duty hours or afterwards. But there are other possibilities. He may apply to some other American installation, or, if it is dangerous for him to be seen going into any American installation, he may send someone else to speak for him. Another possibility is that the person seeking asylum will approach an American in his home or elsewhere. This is a method of making initial contact that has been chosen by some Soviets who wanted to make contact with the U.S. Government. A further possibility is that the asylum request will be made by telephone, either to the Embassy or some other official installation, or to an American's home. Again, such calls may very well not be made during working hours.

Asylum Requests Made in Person at the Chancery During Duty Hours

6. Someone seeking asylum may get as far as the Marine Security Guard (MSG) on duty, or he may make his first substantive contact with the Iranian guard at the main gate of the Chancery. When a non-Iranian applies to the gate guard with a request for asylum, or a request to see the Ambassador or some other officer on business that he will not reveal, -- or makes any similarly unusual request, the guard should refer him to the MSG on duty.

7. If the MSG on duty receives a request of the sort noted in the preceding paragraph either directly or through the gate guard, he should put the visitor in the Guard Rooms as above, and then summon the Security Officer. If the latter is not present, the MSG should discreetly alert the SRF Chief or any other SRF Officer known to him. Out of the visitor's hearing (and of the receptionist's, too) he should telephone and say, "I have a message from Mr. MAYDAY". This arbitrary phrase is the signal that someone has asked for asylum or has an unusual request of the sort noted in Paragraph 6.

8. If summoned as above, the Security Officer, or any other Embassy Officer,

(a) will at once alert SRF by the use of the MAYDAY phrase as abo

(b) should see to the visitor's comfort while awaiting the arriva of the SRF representative.

Note that someone seeking asylum or clandestine contact with the U.S. Government is likely to be under considerable stress. The officer receiving him, therefore, should not leave him alone, if possible, and should do what he can to put him at ease. To the extent that he and the visitor have a common language, he should try to elicit the visitor's basic personalia (i.e., name, citizenship, occupation),

and what it is that he wants. He should make no attempt to interrogate him, however. The officer should listen sympathetically and courteously to the visitor's story and should assure him that someone is coming to talk to him right away, and that his request will be given speedy and secure consideration at the appropriate level. Naturally, the officer must be particularly careful to say nothing that might be interpreted as a promise of asylum in the United States or, indeed, of any other form of U.S. Government assistance -- for example, in leaving Iran and resettling elsewhere.

If the visitor has a passport and other identity documents, and if the circumstances permit it, the receiving officer should make xerox copies of them.

9. Upon his arrival, the SRF representative will take responsibility for further handling.

10. If the visitor cannot wait for the arrival of the SRF Officer the officer should tell the visitor to come back at a clearly specified time, preferably, the same day or as soon afterwards as possible. If, however, the visitor states he cannot risk returning to an American installation, the officer should arrange a meeting for him in a public place which is easily found and to which he can gain access, such as the bar of a local hotel. The visitor should be told to have a magazine in his hand so that the SRF Officer can recognize him. The arrangements as to date, time, place and means of recognition should be specific and clearly understood. Before the visitor leaves, be sure to obtain the following information from him:

A. His name, nationality, date and place of birth, local address (residence or hotel) and local telephone number.

B. physical description as exactly as possible ... clothes he is wearing.

C. Obtain any notes or papers he wishes to leave.

D. Ask him to write out his request if he has sufficient time.

Requests made at the Chancery after Hours or on Holidays

11. During hours or on a holiday, the MSG on duty at the Chancery (Post No. 1) receives a visitor with what appears to be an asylum request or an unusual request of the sort noted in Paragraph 6 above:

(a) he will install the visitor in the Guard Room as in Paragraphs 6 and 7 above,

(b) he will check his log book to see whether any SRF Officer known to him is in the Chancery at the time (on a Friday or Sunday morning, for example). If so, he will alert him to the presence of the visitor by phoning him and using the Mr. MAYDAY phrase as in Paragraph 7.

(c) If no SRF Officer is actually present in the Chancery, the MSG should alert the Security Officer and one of the SRF Officers on his list by telephone. Again he should use the Mr. MAYDAY phrase as in Paragraph 7.

(d) Pending the arrival of the SRF Representative, the MSG will proceed as in Paragraph 8.

(e) If the visitor cannot wait, the MSG should try to arrange an alternate meeting as in Paragraph 10.

Requests made at the Embassy Annex (Consulate)

12. If an asylum or similar request is made at the Consulate during duty hours, the Iranian receptionist should refer the requester to the officer designated by the Chief of the Consular Section. The latter should put the visitor in Room 211 or Room 404 of the Consulate, and then proceed as in Paragraph 8 above. If the request is made after hours or on a holiday, the MSG on duty should put the visitor in the Visa Applicants' Waiting Room, and then proceed as in Paragraph 11 (b), 11 (c), 11 (d), and 11 (e) above.

Requests made at other American Installations

13. Should asylum or similar requests be received at the USIS building, the receiving officer should notify the Embassy Security Officer, who in turn, will notify SRF.

14. If, during duty hours, someone presents himself at an Armish/Maag or Genmish installation with an asylum or similar request, he should be referred to the unit Security Officer. The latter will alert the Embassy Security Officer, who, in turn, will alert SRF. In alerting the Embassy Security Officer, the unit Security Officer will likewise use the Mr. MAYDAY phrase. After hours or on holidays the unit Duty Officer should alert the MSG at the Chancery, who, in turn, will alert the Embassy Security Officer and SRF.

Requests made Elsewhere

15. It is possible that a person seeking asylum or clandestine contact will try to get in touch with an official American at the latter's residence. This is especially possible when they already know each other. Should this happen, the same basic notification and handling procedure is to be followed.

Telephone Messages or Requests

16. A person seeking asylum or contact may think it unwise or even dangerous to come to the Embassy. In such a case he may telephone and

[illegible]k to meet an American official somewhere outside the Embassy. If such a call comes after duty-hours or on a holiday, the MSG will determine if there is a SRF officer known to him in the building and have him take the call. If there is not such an officer, any Embassy Officer who may be in the building should take the call. If no Embassy Officer is present, the MSG will ask the caller to give the telephone number where he can be reached and when. If the caller cannot or will not give such a number, he should be asked to call the Embassy back in two hours time. A SRF officer should be notified immediately and will come to the Embassy to take the call.

17. The same basic procedure is to be followed when asylum requests or requests for contact are made through intermediaries. Whoever receives the request should urge the intermediary to bring the requester to the Chancery. If this is not possible, an outside meeting should be arranged as in Paragraph 10 above. In either case the personalia of both the intermediary and the requester should be noted.

Requests received at Khorramshahr and Tabriz

18. With appropriate changes, the same procedures are to be followed when someone applies for asylum or contact to the consulates in Khorramshahr or Tabriz. The [illegible] of the requester (including the languages he speaks) should be [illegible] and he should be held at the consulate if possible. If he cannot stay, he should be asked to come back no less than two days later. If this is not possible either, an outside meeting in a public place should be arranged for two days later. The two-day delay is to permit a SRF representative to come from Tehran. The consul will alert the Embassy Security Officer or a senior SRF officer, or any other Embassy officer in Tehran by telephone, using the Mr. [illegible] / phrase as above. A SRF officer will then come from Tehran at the earliest opportunity.

Briefing Responsibilities

19. SRF is responsible for briefing the Embassy Security Officer, and, jointly with him, for briefing the Marine Security Guards.

The [illegible]urity Officer is responsible for briefing newly-[illegible] and each successive Embassy Duty Officer. He is responsible for briefing the Marine Security Guards, the receptionist, the switchboard operator and the gate guards.

The Chief of the Consular Section is responsible for briefing officers and the Iranian receptionist at the Consulate.

The Chief, USIS is responsible for briefing his own officers and guards.

The DAO is responsible together with SRF for briefing the security officers at Arnish/Maag and Genmish.

November

TELEPHONE SUBSTITUTION CODE FOR REPORTING WALK-I

This code is for use by the consulates in Tabriz, and Isfahan in reporting to the Embassy the arrival of Walk-In with whom re-contact has been arranged.

In handling a Walk-In, proceed to debrief him acc to the standing Embassy Walk-In instructions. Then at to arrange recontact, either in your city or in Tehran you arrange a follow-up meeting in your city, set it less than 24 hours, and preferrably 48-72 hours, in a so as to allow time for an SRF officer to arrive from If you arrange for re-contact in Tehran, select one o two sites listed below, and allow adequate time for th In to arrive in Tehran. Call the Embassy and use the ate substitutions to signal the Walk-In's status and The telephone conversation need not be verbatim as su here, but should contain the essential elements neces describe the situation:

"This is (caller's name) in (location). I h message for (one of the SRF officers listed in the Em Walk-In instructions). Mr. Mayday, an American busin from (occupation: use city/state code), needs some a tance with an export contract involving (nationality: commodity code). He is particularly interested in (s use appropriate query).

"Can you send us some materials by (latest d time by which an SRF officer should arrive in your ci (Use this if local re-contact has been arranged.)

"He is coming to Tehran, and I've told him t the (place of contact in Tehran: "Embassy" or "Comme Library") on (date/time of contact in Tehran). (Use contact has been arranged for Tehran.)

"Mr. Mayday also would like to discuss trade (indicate languages in which the Walk-In can communic listing appropriate countries, e.g., England for Engl USSR for Russian, ain for Spanish, etc.)

(Refer also to any pertinent miscellaneous information, such as whether the Walk-In is travelling alone or with family, driving his own car, how much time he will have in Iran, etc.)

Arranging Contact in Tehran:

a. If the Walk-In will agree, ask him to come to the Embassy at an exact and specific time and date. In your telephone message, indicate the time and date, and state that you have told Mr. Mayday to go to "the Embassy."

b. If the Walk-In insists on being met outside the Embassy in Tehran, set a specific time and date, and tell him to await contact by an American official on the sidewalk outside the entrance to the Caspian Hotel on Tachte Jamshid, two blocks West of the American Embassy. He should carry a visible English-language newspaper to facilitate recognition. The American approaching the Walk-In will introduce himself and ask if the Walk-In is the person who visited the Consulate in Tabriz, Shiraz or Isfahan. In your telephone message, indicate the time an date, and state that you have told Mr. Mayday to go to the ommercial Library.".

I. Nationality Code

a. Soviet Union.....Silver

b. Chinese Peoples Republic.....Chinaware

c. Poland.....Paper

d. Czechoslovakia.....Crystal

e. German Democratic Republic.....Gold

f. Hungary.....Hemp

g. Yugoslavia.....Yarn

h. Albania.....Asphalt

i. Romania.....Rubber

j. Bulgaria.....Brick

k. Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.....Kaolin clay

l. North Vietnam.....Vinyl plastic

m. Cuba.....Cigars

n. Iraq.....Iron

o. Syria.....Soda

p. Libya.....Lead

q. Palestinian, or terrorist of any nationality.....Tin

II. Occupation Code

a. Intelligence/Security officer.....Indiana

b. Diplomat.....Denver

c. Trade Representative.....Texas

d. Communist party official.....Connecticut

e. Technician.....Tennessee

f. Military officer.....Maine

g. Soldier, enlisted man.....San Francisco

h. Other.....Omaha

III. Status Code

a. Has information for the USG....."information on U.S. customs regulations."

b. Wishes to work secretly for the USG....."information on work permits in the U.S."

c. Seeks asylum or defection, but might be able to return to his country and work for the USG....."discussing alternative routing."

d. Seeks asylum, cannot return to his country....."discussing Iranian export permits."

e. Is intermediary for someone else....."talking to a local broker."

f. Is illegal border crosser....."discussing possibility of border closures."

g. Other....."talking to someone in the Embassy instead of a Consulate."